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In sum, whether Take-The-Best is fast, is architecture depen-
dent, and whether frugality is a virtue are questioned by the many
other cognitive functions that require fast, parallel, and integra-
tive approaches. Moreover, the weak empirical basis for Take-
The-Best seems consistent with people normally adopting an in-
tegrative approach (albeit with limited cues).
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Abstract: Although we welcome Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Re-
search Group’s shift of emphasis from “coherence” to “correspondence”
criteria, their rejection of optimality in human decision making is prema-
ture: In many situations, experts can achieve near-optimal performance.
Moreover, this competence does not require implausible computing
power. The models Gigerenzer et al. evaluate fail to account for many of
the most robust properties of human decision making, including examples
of optimality.
A paradox in the rationale for fast and frugal algorithms. There
is a curious paradox in Gigerenzer et al.’s argument for the role of
fast and frugal algorithms in human decision-making (Gigerenzer et
al. 1999). They suggest that psychologists have been led astray by
focusing on behavior from an optimization perspective and they
imply that optimization models are implausible, intractable, and
require demonic capacities. Instead, they urge us to explore fast
and frugal algorithms. Yet they admit on p. 237 that categorization
performance can often be optimal, but if that is the case, then surely
the case for fast and frugal algorithms – which will almost certainly
never achieve this level of performance – evaporates?
To evaluate Gigerenzer et al.’s case for minimal complexity in
cognitive processes it is critical to determine whether decision
making is truly optimal. The jury is still out on this issue, of course,
but what is indisputable is that near-optimal performance can be
achieved by experts in many realms including categorization (An-
derson 1991; Ashby & Maddox 1992) and choice (Binmore 1991;
Davis et al. 1993).
Gigerenzer et al. repeatedly ridicule what they take to be “op-
timal” theories (e.g., multiple linear regression, MLR) on the
grounds that they require unrealistic amounts of computation
(e.g., p. 76), but this is a highly misleading claim. Contrary to the
impression made by Gigerenzer et al., it is possible to find a re-
gression solution in minimal time without doing any computa-
tion at all. Imagine a set of points each represented by a peg on
a two-dimensional board (the solution also works in principle in
n dimensions). Then attach a long thin rod by a set of elastic
bands to the pegs. By minimizing the allocation of tension across
the elastic bands, the rod will align exactly according to the re-
gression equation. As another example, consider the well-known
Travelling Salesman problem in which the shortest route must
be computed that visits each of a number (N) of cities exactly
once. Despite its computational complexity (the computing time
needed to solve this problem increases faster than any power of
N), near-optimal solutions can be achieved by parallel neural
networks in the blink of an eye (Hopfield & Tank 1985). What
objection is there to the view that the human cognitive system
approximates optimality by use of parallel constraint-satisfaction
processes?
It is also troubling that Gigerenzer et al. take multiple linear re-
gression (MLR) as one of their benchmark models throughout the
book. Humans can learn highly nonlinear judgment rules in a va-
riety of domains (Ashby & Maddox 1992; Ceci & Liker 1986) so
MLR is simply not an appropriate model. If TTB (Take The Best)
and CBE (categorization by elimination) approximately match the
performance of MLR and if human experts significantly outper-
form MLR then the obvious conclusion is that TTB and CBE are
inadequate models of human performance.
Implausibility of the CBE model. We believe that the candidate
fast-and-frugal model for categorization which Gigerenzer et al.
present, the CBE model, is wholly inadequate for human perfor-
mance. First, it is unable to predict one of the benchmark phe-
nomena of categorization, namely the ubiquitous “exemplar ef-
fect,” that is, the finding that classification of a test item is affected
by its similarity to specific study items, all else held constant (e.g.,
Whittlesea 1987). Even in the case of medical diagnosis, decision-
making in situations very like the heart-attack problem Gigeren-
zer et al. describe is known to be strongly influenced by memory
for specific prior cases (Brooks et al. 1991). The recognition
heuristic is not adequate to explain this effect because it concerns
the relative similarity of previous cases, not the absolute presence
versus absence of a previous case. If a heavy involvement of mem-
ory in simple decision tasks seems to characterize human perfor-
mance accurately, then plainly models which ignore this feature
must be inadequate.
Second, there is strong evidence against deterministic response
rules of the sort embodied in Gigerenzer et al.’s fast-and-frugal
algorithms (Friedman & Massaro 1998): for instance, Kalish and
Kruschke (1997) found that such rules were rarely used even in a
one-dimensional classification problem. Thirdly, CBE is not a
model of learning: it says nothing about how cue validities and re-
sponse assignments are learned. When compared with other cur-
rent models of categorization such as exemplar, connectionist, and
decision-bound models, which suffer none of these drawbacks,
the CBE model begins to look seriously inadequate.
Methodology of testing the models. By taking a tiny domain of
application (and one which is artificial and highly constrained),
Gigerenzer et al. find that the CBE model performs competently
and conclude that much of categorization is based on the applica-
tion of such algorithms. Yet they mostly do not actually fit the
model to human data. The data in Tables 5-4, 11-1, and so on, are
for objective classifications, not actual human behavior. It is hard
to see how a model’s ability to classify objects appropriately ac-
cording to an objective standard provides any evidence that hu-
mans classify in the same way as the model.
Even in the cases they describe, the models often seriously un-
derperform other models such as a neural network (Table 11-1).
Compared to the more standard approach in this field, in which
researchers fit large sets of data and obtain log-likelihood mea-
sures of fit, the analyses in Chapters 5 and 11 are very rudimen-
tary. Gigerenzer et al. report percent correct data, which is known
to be a very poor measure of model performance, and use very
small datasets, which are certain to be highly nondiscriminating.
The difference between the CBE model and a neural network
(e.g., up to 9% in Table 11.1) is vast by the standards of catego-
rization research: for instance, Nosofsky (1987) was able to distin-
guish to a statistically-significant degree between two models
which differed by 1% in their percentages of correct choices.
Melioration as a fast-and-frugal mechanism. The algorithms
explored by Gigerenzer et al. (TTB, CBE, etc.) share the common
feature that when a cue is selected and that cue discriminates be-
tween the choice alternatives, a response is emitted which de-
pends solely on the value of that cue. Gigerenzer et al. (Ch. 15, p.
327, Goodie et al.) consider the application of such models to the
simplest possible choice situation in which a repeated choice is
made between two alternatives in an unchanging context. The
prototypical version of such a situation is an animal operant choice
task in which, say, a food reinforcer is delivered according to one
schedule for left-lever responses and according to an independent
schedule for right-lever responses. As Gigerenzer et al. point out
(p. 343), fast-and-frugal algorithms predict choice of the alterna-
tive with the highest value or reinforcement rate. Although this
may seem like a sensible prediction, human choice does not con-
form to such a “momentary-maximization” or “melioration” process.
In situations in which such a myopic process does not maximize
overall reinforcement rate, people are quite capable of adopting
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better response strategies. A well-known example is the Harvard
Game (Herrnstein 1997) in which one response alternative (say,
right) always pays more at any moment than the other (left), but
where overall reinforcement rate is maximized by allocating all re-
sponses to left. People’s behavior is often seen to approach opti-
mality under such conditions (Herrnstein et al. 1993; R. Tunney
& D. Shanks, unpublished data). Yet again we have an example of
humans’ ability to achieve near optimal levels of performance, ex-
actly as the “demonic” theory of rational choice predicts.
The selection problem. Gigerenzer et al. say very little about
how individual heuristics are selected for application to specific
problem domains. Such meta-level decisions will typically require
some prior knowledge about the structure of the environment
(e.g., whether it is non-compensatory, J-shaped, etc.), which may
add substantially to the overall processing costs of a fast and fru-
gal model. This would reduce its advantage over those models that
can learn about the environment and have general applicability
(thus cutting out the metadecision stage). In the majority of the
simulations in the book, one particular heuristic is pre-selected to
operate in a specific environment. More rigorous tests would
place a complete fast and frugal system (different heuristics plus
metadecision heuristics) in a variety of different environments,
and compare its performance against an alternative general-
purpose learning model.
The precision/accuracy trade-off. On a more positive note, we
welcome Gigerenzer et al.’s shift of emphasis from “coherence” to
“correspondence” criteria. This is an important step towards a
more complete understanding of rationality, and removes some of
the obstacles placed by the heuristics-and-biases school. In addi-
tion to the examples cited in the book, the inadequacy of coher-
ence criteria has been demonstrated in various experiments in
which people trade the probability of being correct for increased
precision in their judgments (Yaniv & Foster 1995), thereby sac-
rificing probabilistic coherence for a possible gain in informational
content. It is not clear, however, how readily this fits into the fast
and frugal picture. Computing a trade-off between precision and
accuracy would appear to place additional processing demands on
the decision maker, contrary to the spirit of speed and frugality.
We believe that this problem is resolvable by identifying the
appropriate correspondence criterion, and the cognitive mecha-
nisms attuned to this criterion. Recent work in human causal in-
duction (López et al. 1998) suggests that predictive judgments are
mediated by associative mechanisms sensitive to real-world statis-
tical contingencies. Furthermore, it can be shown that networks
sensitive to such a measure automatically compute a precision/ac-
curacy trade-off. This suggests, contra Gigerenzer et al., that al-
though the mechanisms underlying our mental algorithms may be
simple, the computations which they embody need not be.
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Abstract: Simple heuristics that make us smart offers an impressive com-
pilation of work that demonstrates fast and frugal (one-reason) heuristics
can be simple, adaptive, and accurate. However, many decision environ-
ments differ from those explored in the book. We conducted a Monte
Carlo simulation that shows one-reason strategies are accurate in
“friendly” environments, but less accurate in “unfriendly” environments
characterized by negative cue intercorrelations, that is, tradeoffs.
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